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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has sole discretion in the granting or denying of a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Utah Court of Appeals adjudication. UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78-2-2(5). The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over a judgment of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I. Whether an occupant who holds title to real property subject to a reversionary 
interest - as reflected by the 1993 Deed in this case - is entitled to compensation for 
improvements under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act and, if so, whether the court of 
appeals properly determined the value of those improvements. On certiorari, the Supreme 
Court reviews the court of appeals decision for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no 
deference. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, U 7, 86 P.3d 742. 
Issue II. Whether the 1993 Deed required Petitioner Allen to assume any existing 
mortgage notwithstanding intervening refinancing of that mortgage by Petitioner Allen's 
wife and a third-party. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the court of appeals 
decision for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference. State v. Geukgeuzian, 
2004 UT 16,1(7, 86P.3d742. 
Issue III. Whether the court of appeals failed to consider Petitioner Allen's own claim 
for unjust enrichment. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the court of appeals 
decision for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference. State v. Geukgeuzian, 
2004 UT 164 7, 86P.3d742. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provision is determinative or of central importance to this 
appeal: 
UTAH CODE ANN. §57-6-1 et.seq. Utah Occupying Claimants Act. See 
Addendum, Exhibit "A." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner Allen conveyed certain real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah (the 
"Property") to his former spouse, Ms. Satterfield, pursuant to a Decree of Divorce. Petitioner 
Allen conveyed to Ms. Satterfield a fee simple determinable, subject to a possibility of 
reverter, and retained a right of reversion in the Property. Upon the occurrence of the 
determining events, the fee simple determinable automatically terminated and title to the 
Property automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen by operation of law. Petitioner Allen 
gave notice of his claim of title, ownership and possession of the Property to Ms. 
Satterfield's successor in interest, Respondent Hall. Respondent Hall refused to relinquish 
possession of the Property and this case ensued. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Petitioner Allen brought suit against Respondent Hall and Respondent Homecomings 
on May 18, 2000 claiming: (1) right to title, ownership and possession of the Property; and 
(2) restitution of the unjust enrichment of Respondents for their failure to relinquish the 
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Property to Petitioner Allen upon the automatic reversion of the Property to him by operation 
of law. Record at 4, Complaint. 
Respondent Hall answered the allegations of the complaint denying the same and 
brought his counterclaim alleging: (1) ownership of the Property free and clear of the 
possibility of reverter of Petitioner Allen; (2) damages for the unjust enrichment of Petitioner 
Allen from improvements made to the Property by Respondent Hall; (3) damages pursuant 
to UTAH CODE ANN. §57-6-1, et.seq., the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, for 
improvements made to the Property by Respondent Hall; and (4) damages for Respondent 
Hall's inability to refinance the Property during the pendency of the matter. Record at 106, 
Answer and Counterclaim. 
Respondent Hall brought a third-party claim against Colonial Title Insurance Agency, 
Michael E. Huber and Ms. Satterfield seeking indemnification for any loss sustained by him 
if Petitioner Allen were to prevail. Record at 128, Third Party Complaint. The third-party 
complaint against Colonial Title Insurance Agency and Michael E. Huber was dismissed on 
summary judgment. Record at 461, Order of Dismissal Third Party Defendants. 
Respondent Homecomings answered the allegations of the Complaint denying the 
same. 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley on May 20,2003. The 
trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 10,2003. Record at 
530, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial court entered its Order and Decree 
Quieting Title on July 2, 2003. Record at 544, Order and Decree Quieting Title. The trial 
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court denied Petitioner Allen's claim to the Property and also denied his claim for unjust 
enrichment without comment, presumably because with no ownership interest in the 
Property, Petitioner Allen could not maintain a claim for unjust enrichment from the 
Property. Record at 545. The trial court quieted title to the Property in Respondent Hall, 
found Respondent Hall's claim under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act to be moot 
inasmuch as title to the Property was awarded to Respondent Hall and denied Respondent 
Hall's claim for damages for inability to refinance the Property. Record at 545. The trial 
court did not rule on Respondent Hall's third-party claim against Ms. Satterfield, presumably 
because it also would be moot inasmuch as title to the Property was awarded to Respondent 
Hall. 
Petitioner Allen filed his Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Order and Decree 
Quieting Title with the Utah Supreme Court on July 31,2003 and the matter was transferred 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. Record at 547. On January 21, 2005, the Utah Court of 
Appeals issued its Opinion reversing in part and affirming in part. See Addendum, Exhibit 
"B." The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Petitioner Allen's claim 
to the Property and awarded title to the Property to Petitioner Allen. The Utah Court of 
Appeals did not address Petitioner Allen's claim for restitution of Respondents' unjust 
enrichment from the Property. The Utah Court of Appeals found that because Respondent 
Hall was not entitled to the Property, his claim under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act was 
not moot and the court awarded him damages under that Act. The Utah Court of Appeals 
also found that Petitioner Allen was obligated to pay all debts on the Property. 
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Statement of Facts 
On or about May 15, 1989, Petitioner Allen acquired the Property. The Property is 
located at 10159 Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah 84092. Record at 580. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
On or about May 17, 1990, Petitioner Allen and his former spouse, Ms. Satterfield, 
were legally divorced by order of a Decree of Divorce. Record at 585. See Addendum, 
Exhibit "C." 
Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce, Ms. Satterfield was awarded the 
Property subject to Petitioner Allen's possibility of reverter which was triggered if Ms. 
Satterfield moved more than fifty (50) miles away from Salt Lake City, Utah, before 
Petitioner Allen's youngest child reached the age of eighteen (18) years. Record at 586-587. 
See Addendum, Exhibit "C." 
On or about October 28, 1993, Petitioner Allen executed a Quitclaim Deed Subject 
to Reservations, Reversions, and Exceptions transferring to Msr. Satterfield an interest in the 
Property, subject to Petitioner Allen's possibility of reverter, (the " 1993 Deed"). Record at 
590. See Addendum, Exhibit "D." 
The 1993 Deed states that it is subject to the rights and reservations included in the 
Decree of Divorce and specifically recites "...if the grantee [Ms. Satterfield] shall move more 
than 50 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah, before the grantor [Petitioner Allen] and grantee's 
[Ms. Satterfield's] last child reaches 18 years of age, title and ownership of the above-
described property [the Property] shall revert to grantor [Petitioner Allen]." Record at 591. 
See Addendum, Exhibit "D." 
5 
Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and the 1993 Deed, Ms. Satterfield's interest in the 
Property is subject to Petitioner Allen's possibility of reverter in the Property. See 
Addendum, Exhibit "C" and Exhibit "D." 
The Decree of Divorce further provides that if ownership of the Property reverts to 
Petitioner Allen, he will sell the Property and divide the proceeds equally with Ms. 
Satterfield. The 1993 Deed makes no mention of this provision. See Addendum, Exhibit 
"C" and Exhibit "D." 
On or about January 19,1998, Ms. Satterfield executed a Quit Claim Deed conveying 
her interest in the Property to Respondent Hall (the "Hall Quit Claim Deed"). The Hall Quit 
Claim Deed was duly filed with and recorded by the Salt Lake County Recorder on June 23, 
1999. See Defendants' Exhibit 12. 
On or about June 7,1999, Respondent Hall and his wife, Elizabeth J. Hall, executed 
a Deed of Trust conveying a security interest in the Property to Respondent Homecomings 
to secure the repayment of a loan to Respondent Hall by Respondent Homecomings. The 
Deed of Trust was duly filed with and recorded by the Salt Lake County Recorder on June 
23, 1999. Record at 658. 
On or about July 19,1999, Ms. Satterfield moved more than 50 miles from Salt Lake 
City, Utah, triggering the determining event in Respondent Hall's fee simple determinable 
and title to the Property automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen. Record at 595. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Respondent Hall is not entitled to any recovery under the Utah Occupying 
Claimants Act because he lacked "color of title" as required by that Act. There is a 
distinction between color of title and actual or legal title, with color of title being less than, 
but not included in, an actual or legal title. Respondent Hall held actual and legal title to the 
Property in the form of a fee simple determinable, subject to possibility of reverter, but 
Respondent Hall did not have color of title as required by the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. 
The Utah Occupying Claimants Act is not intended to compensate legal owners of real 
property whose title terminates in the normal course by operation of law. 
If Respondent Hall were entitled to recovery under the Utah Occupying Claimants 
Act, the amount of that recovery was improperly determined by the court of appeals. The 
matter should be remanded to the trial court for determination of the amount of the recovery 
in accordance with the terms of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. 
2. Neither the 1993 Deed nor the Decree of Divorce required Petitioner Allen to 
assume or to satisfy any indebtedness of the Property which was not in existence on the date 
of the Decree of Divorce. The 1993 Deed makes no mention of any obligation or payment. 
The Decree of Divorce clearly speaks to the debt encumbering the Property at the time of the 
Decree of Divorce and the related equity but makes no provision for the payment by 
Petitioner Allen of any subsequent indebtedness. If the language of the Decree of Divorce 
is not sufficiently clear, then parol evidence of the parties' intent must be considered. That 
evidence is uncontroverted and clearly states that Petitioner Allen was not to assume any 
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obligation for subsequent indebtedness on the Property. Neither Respondent Hall nor 
Respondent Homecomings has any basis for claim under the Decree of Divorce because 
neither is a party to the Decree of Divorce and neither can claim to be a third-party 
beneficiary under the Decree of Divorce. 
3. Petitioner Allen's claim for restitution of the unjust enrichment to Respondents 
became moot when the trial court denied Petitioner Allen's claim of title. However, when 
the court of appeals reversed the trial court and awarded Petitioner Allen title to the Property, 
it would be inequitable for Respondents to retain the benefits of possession and use of the 
Property, after their interests terminated, without compensating Petitioner Allen for the value 
of those benefits. Ownership of the Properly automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen on 
July 19,1999. When his title terminated, Respondent Hall refused to deliver possession and 
use of the Property to Petitioner Allen and retained the benefits of ownership, possession and 
use of the Property for himself. From July 19, 1999 until the date that Petitioner Allen 
ultimately obtains his rights of ownership, possession and use of the Property, Respondent 
Hall is unjustly enriched in that he has accepted the benefits of possession and use of 
Petitioner Allen's Property, he had knowledge that he was retaining those benefits and that 
doing so was adverse to Petitioner Allen's ownership, and he retained those benefits for 
himself under circumstances which would make it inequitable for him to do so without 
payment of their value to Petitioner Allen. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. WHETHER AN OCCUPANT WHO HOLDS TITLE TO PROPERTY SUBJECT TO A 
REVERSIONARY INTEREST - AS REFLECTED BY THE 1993 DEED IN THIS CASE 
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- IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR IMPROVEMENTS UNDER THE UTAH 
OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS ACT AND, IF SO, WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS 
PROPERLY DETERMINED THE VALUE OF THOSE IMPROVEMENTS. 
Respondent Hall acquired a fee simple determinable, subject to possibility of reverter, 
title to the Property. Upon the occurrence of the determining event, Respondent Hall's 
interest in the Property automatically terminated by operation of law. Respondent Hall made 
a claim to recover compensation for the value of improvements that he made to the Property 
while he was the legal owner. The Utah Occupying Claimants Act does not and is not 
intended to provide a remedy to legal owners of real property whose ownership terminates 
in the normal course by operation of law. 
A. Recovery Under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. 
The Utah Occupying Claimants Act, as presently codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 
§57-6-1 et seq., has been in existence for almost one hundred years. Yet during that time, 
only approximately two dozen reported cases, including this case, have been brought 
asserting a claim under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. In each of these cases, claims 
under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act were asserted only by claiming occupying real 
property but without actual title to the same, such as an adverse possession interest in real 
property or by claimants who had obtained their "color of title" through a defective or 
disputed tax sale or through fraud or misrepresentation. In none of these cases, excepting 
this case, did any claimant assert or was any claimant awarded any recovery under the Utah 
Occupying Claimants Act for improvements made while the claimant held valid legal title 
to real property. 
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The important element to note here is that the Utah Occupying Claimants Act is to 
provide a remedy to occupants of real property, who reasonably believe that they own real 
property, but in reality lack legal title, and who under their mistaken belief of ownership 
make improvements to real property. The Utah Occupying Claimants Act is not intended to 
provide a remedy to owners of real property whose estate terminates by operation of law. 
Hence, the Act is named for its intended beneficiaries, "occupying claimants" not the 
"owning claimants." 
Phrased another way, the Utah Occupying Claimants Act is intended to benefit those 
whose good faith belief of ownership is subsequently proved false, and not those whose 
actual legal ownership terminates by operation of law. 
The rulings of the trial court and the court of appeals in this case are inconsistent with 
the established law of real property and are in conflict with the established application of the 
Utah Occupying Claimants Act in all other reported Utah cases. 
For example, if the rulings of the trial court and the court of appeals in this case are 
to be followed, the holder of a life estate in real property, or more specifically his heirs, could 
make a claim upon the termination of the life estate against the holder of the remainder 
interest in real property to recover the value of improvements made to real property by the 
life tenant during the term of his life estate. This is obviously not the intent of the Utah 
Occupying Claimants Act. It is well established in real property law that upon the 
termination of a life estate, any improvements made to real property by the life tenant pass 
with the real property to the remainderman or to the holder of the reversionary interest. 
10 
More to the point, if the ruling of the trial court and the court of appeals in this case 
are to be followed, the holder of any estate which is less than a fee simple absolute could 
make a claim to recover the value of improvements to real property upon termination of that 
estate, putting an unintended burden upon the remainderman or reversionary interest holder. 
Again, this is obviously not the intent of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. 
Moreover, if the ruling of the trial court and the court of appeals in this case are to be 
followed, the way would be opened for absurd outcomes. For example, a real property owner 
makes valuable improvements to his property in good faith, but neglects to pay the mortgage 
and his interest is foreclosed. Would the trial court or the court of appeals allow this property 
owner to recover the value of his improvements from the lender? Again, this is obviously 
not the intent of the Act. 
This Court should limit the scope of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act to include 
only those occupants with color of title and not owners who hold actual or legal title. 
In this case, Respondent Hall's title to the Property was a fee simple determinable 
estate, subject to a possibility of reverter. Upon the occurrence of the determining event, 
Respondent Hall's title to the Property terminated. Upon the automatic termination of his 
estate, Respondent Hall forfeited all claims to the Property and any improvements thereon. 
Respondent Hall realized the full use and enjoyment of the full legal estate to which he was 
entitled during the term of his estate and upon termination of his estate he has no claim 
against the holder of the reversionary interest either under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act 
or otherwise. Respondent Hall's estate in the Property terminated automatically, upon the 
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occurrence of the triggering event, he was not "in a proper action found not to be the 
owner,...'5 of the Property. UTAH CODE ANN. §57-6-1. 
There are three components to a claim under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. The 
claimant must be an occupant of real estate under "color of title," and have made valuable 
improvements to the real estate in good faith. Each of these components is addressed here 
in turn. 
Color of Title. Respondent Hall did not occupy the Property under color of title and 
he did not have color of title to the Property. Respondent Hall occupied the Property 
pursuant to his actual legal title to the Property, defined as a fee simple determinable, subject 
to a possibility of reverter. 
It is essential to note that color of title is not legal title. "Color of title" is defined by 
Black's Law Dictionary as "that which is a semblance or appearance of title, but is not title 
in fact or in law." See McCoy v. Lowrie, 42 Wash. 2d 24, 253 P.2d 415, 418. This 
distinction is consistent with the recognition that the Utah Occupying Claimants Act deals 
with disputed or conflicting claims to real property and not to the normal legal succession of 
interests in real property. 
Petitioner Allen does not dispute that Respondent Hall held legal title to the Property, 
but merely points out that as the holder of legal title to the Property, Respondent Hall cannot 
claim that he occupies the Property under color of title as the two are inapposite to one 
another. Further, Respondent Hall's legal title to the Property terminated upon the 
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occurrence of the triggering event and Petitioner Allen is the legal successor in interest to 
the Property by operation of law. 
Valuable Improvements. A claimant under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act must 
make valuable improvements on the real estate. UTAH CODE ANN. §57-6-1. The Utah 
Occupying Claimants Act further requires that the complaint of the party claiming under that 
Act "must [emphasis added] set forth the grounds on which the defendant seeks relief, stating 
as accurately as practicable the value of the real estate, exclusive of the improvements 
thereon made by the claimant or his grantors, and the value of such improvements." UTAH 
CODE ANN. §57-6-2. Respondent Hall's Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim 
did neither and therefore his pleading was defective and his claim should be denied. [Record 
at 275] 
"The issues joined thereon must be tried as in law actions, and the value of the real 
estate and of such improvements must be separately ascertained on the trial." UTAH CODE 
ANN. §57-6-2. Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals determined separately the 
value of the real estate or the value of the improvements. 
Thus, based upon Respondent Hall's failure to meet the foregoing requirements of the 
Utah Occupying Claimants Act, there can be no finding of valuable improvements made to 
the Property. Alternatively, the Court may wish to consider a finding of valuable 
improvements in light of the determination of the value of any such improvements as 
addressed below. 
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Good Faith. The Utah Occupying Claimants Act requires that the claimant must have 
made the improvements to the real estate in good faith. The good faith of an occupying 
claimant must be premised upon a reasonable and honest belief of ownership. See Ute-Cal 
LandDev. Corp. v. Sather, 645 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah 1982). 
The trial court concluded that Respondent Hall had constructive notice of Petitioner 
Allen's possibility of reverter pursuant to the recording statute. Record at 530. The court 
of appeals likewise found that Respondent Hall knew of Petitioner Allen's possibility of 
reverter. See Addendum, Exhibit "B." The court of appeals refers to Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 
P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 1998) for the proposition that a good faith belief in a life interest in 
land satisfies the good faith requirement of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. That may 
be so, but two additional observations from Jeffs need to be made. First, the claimants did 
not have a actual legal title to a life estate. They merely believed that they had a life estate. 
Again, the distinction is between color of title and legal title. Second, while the court 
awarded the claimants recovery under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, the facts of the 
case are that the claimants' occupancy was terminated prior to the termination of the life 
estate that they believed that they had. Jeffs should not be held for the proposition that the 
claimants would have been entitled to recovery upon termination of their believed life estate 
in the normal course, by operation of. 
B. Determination of the Value of Improvements. 
The trial court ruled that Respondent Hall's claim under the Utah Occupying 
Claimants Act was moot. The trial court made no award to Respondent Hall under this 
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claim. Record at 545. The trial court found that Respondent Hall had spent $42,279.00 for 
improvements to the Property, $ 10,000.00 for labor and $6,974.67 for real property taxes for 
the years 1998 through 2002. Record at 530, paragraph 20. The trial court failed to find the 
value of the real estate, exclusive of the improvements, or the value, as opposed to the cost, 
of the improvements. The trial court merely identified the alleged cost of the improvements 
as presented by Respondent Hall. This finding is insufficient to comply with the 
requirements of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. The trial court made no findings as to 
what extent, if any, these expenditures increased the value of the Property. 
The court of appeals found in the Record an increase in the value of the Property and 
improperly assumed that the increase was a result of the improvements made by Respondent 
Hall, ignoring all other market factors such as fluctuating interest rates, general economic 
factors, or supply and demand. See Addendum, Exhibit "B." 
In Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 156, 203 P.2d 387, 391-92 (1949), the court 
explained that, "[t]he reasonable cost of the improvements, alone, is not sufficient evidence 
of value,...." Id. 203 P.2d at 392. The Utah Supreme Court has further explained that to 
allow a different measure of recovery, such as allowing the claimant to "recover costs of 
construction, disassociated from land value and not limited to the extent of enhancement of 
land value, which cost could well exceed such enhancement, would cast a burden upon the 
record owner greater than the equitable requirement that he do equity by paying for unjust 
enrichment." Id. 
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In discussing the value of the improvements claimed under the Utah Occupying 
Claimants Act, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the measure of recovery for the 
improvements is the increased value of real property due to the improvements. The Supreme 
Court stated, "the occupying claimant's measure of recovery is the extent to which his 
improvements enhance the value of the land, or in other words, the difference between the 
reasonable relative values of the land with and without the improvements." See Hi-Country 
Estates v. Bagley & Co., 928 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Utah App. 1996). 
Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals in this case has met the standards 
established by this Court for the determination of the value of improvements to real estate 
under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. 
Respondent Hall had actual legal title to the Property in the form of a fee simple 
determinable, subject to a possibility of reverter, and did not occupy the Property under color 
of title as required by the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. Therefore, he has not met the 
requirements of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act and should not be entitled to any 
recovery under such Act. No determination of valuable improvements to the Property or the 
value of such improvements has been made in compliance with the requirements of the Utah 
Occupying Claimants Act. Therefore, if this Court determines that Respondent Hall is 
entitled to recovery under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, the issue of the value of the 
improvements, if any, should be remanded to the trial court for a determination in accordance 
with the Act. The findings of the court of appeals are not consistent with the requirements 
of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. 
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II. WHETHER THE 1993 DEED REQUIRED ALLEN TO ASSUME ANY EXISTING 
MORTGAGE NOTWITHSTANDING INTERVENING REFINANCING OF THAT 
MORTGAGE BY ALLEN'S WIFE AND A THIRD-PARTY. 
The 1993 Deed contains no provision for the payment of any debt encumbering the 
Property by Petitioner Allen, except by reference to the Decree of Divorce. The Decree of 
Divorce contains no provision for the payment of any debt encumbering the Property by 
Petitioner Allen, except for the debt existing on the date of the Decree of Divorce. Neither 
Respondent Hall nor Respondent Homecomings nor any of their successors in interest has 
any claim against the Property or against Petitioner Allen for the payment of any debt that 
may have encumbered the Property. To allow any such claim would be in conflict with 
accepted principles of real property law and contract law. 
Real Property Analysis 
If principles of real property are applied in this case, neither Respondent Hall nor 
Respondent Homecomings nor any of their successors in interest has any claim against the 
Property. 
Petitioner Allen conveyed title to the Property to Ms. Satterfield with the 1993 Deed. 
That title consisted of a fee simple determinable, subject to a possibility of reverter, with 
Petitioner Allen retaining the reversionary interest. At the time of the 1993 Deed the 
Property was subject to a mortgage which secured the repayment of a note signed by both 
Petitioner Allen and Ms. Satterfield. 
Ms. Satterfield refinanced the Property. She alone signed the note, she alone received 
the proceeds and satisfied the prior debt on the Property and she alone signed the mortgage 
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of the Property to secure the repayment of the new debt. Because Ms. Satterfield was the 
sole signer of the mortgage, then the security interest that was conveyed to the lender was 
limited to her interest in the Property, a fee simple determinable, subject to possibility of 
reverter. Petitioner Allen did not become a party to any financing or to any mortgage of the 
Property after the date of the 1993 Deed. 
When Ms. Satterfield quitclaimed the Property to Respondent Hall, she could only 
convey to him and he could only receive so much interest in the Property as she legally 
owned, a fee simple determinable, subject to a possibility of reverter. When Respondent Hall 
refinanced the Property, his trust deed could only grant to Respondent Homecomings a 
security interest in so much of the Property as he legally owned, a fee simple determinable, 
subject to a possibility of reverter. 
When Ms. Satterfield left the state of Utah in 1999, she triggered the determining 
event of title to the Property and the possibility of reverter automatically terminated 
Respondent Hall's interest in the Property, automatically terminated Respondent 
Homecomings' security interest in the Property and then automatically vested title to the 
Property in Petitioner Allen. 
Upon the reversion of the Property to Mr. Allen, he held title to the Property free and 
clear of any and all claims to the Property by Ms. Satterfield, Respondent Hall, Respondent 
Homecomings and all those taking through them. Thus, while the Respondents argue that 
the Decree of Divorce requires Petitioner Allen to satisfy their claims against the Property, 
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the reality is that they have no claim against the Property nor have they established any basis 
for any claim against Petitioner Allen. 
Petitioner Allen is entitled lo ownership ul tin h o p c r h lice mid clem ol Jin and .ill 
claiming through them. 
Contract Analysis 
If pi inciples of contract law are applied ii 1 tl lis case, neither KespcikK. 
Petitioner Allen or against the Property. 
The Decree ofDivorce is in the nature of a contract between two parties, Petitioner 
Alloxan, ,\! NM.;*^iiiek; i t i e r e a r e n o , . . . , ,
 r i ; i . . .. i .vW.wv*. ivorce 1! 
i • • I Hie I) 
exist and woiilerrini? rights that are not present. Ihe court oi appeals concurred in this 
erroneous construction. 
1 1 le second sentence of Paragrapl i 10 of the Decree ofDivorce awaru:, .:.. : :opertv 
t()I\ Is Satterfield. si lbjecttocei tail i coi lditioi is, ai id states ,c[t]l le defei idai it 
shall be responsible for all indebtedness and expenses therefrom, holding the plaintiff 
[Petitioner Allen] harmless therefrom." This portion of the Decree ofDivorce is absolutely 
clear tl lat l"\ Is Satterfield alone is respoi isible foi all indebted] K.- ^ encumbei the 
indebtedness and expenses oi the Propel .A addition, Petitioner Allen is to be held 
19 
harmless from all indebtedness and expenses of the Property. This language does not impose 
any obligation on Petitioner Allen for any indebtedness or expenses of the Property. To the 
contrary, Petitioner Allen is to be held harmless from all indebtedness and expenses of the 
Property. 
The fifth sentence of Paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce states in part that upon 
the occurrence of the triggering event, "the ownership of the marital residence [the Property] 
shall revert to the plaintiff [Petitioner Allen], who will then sell the home and divide the 
proceeds equally with the defendant [Ms. Satterfield], and who will be responsible for all 
indebtedness thereon until the house is sold." It is clear from the foregoing that the order of 
events is (i) reversion of the Property to Petitioner Allen, (ii) sale of the Property, (iii) 
division of the proceeds, and (iv) Petitioner Allen to service the debt on the Property from 
the point in time that ownership reverts to him until the Property is sold. There is nothing 
in the Decree of Divorce that places any obligation on Petitioner Allen to satisfy or pay-off 
any indebtedness of the Property, but only the responsibility to service the indebtedness until 
the Property is sold, at which time he would be reimbursed for any outlays pursuant to the 
above referenced "hold harmless" provision. 
Additional clarification comes from a reading of the final sentence of Paragraph 10 
of the Decree of Divorce which states that "[t]hese provisions are to ensure that the children 
have a suitable residence during their minority, are structured to provide a benefit to the 
defendant [Ms. Satterfield] if she shall continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah, in the form 
of all of the equity in said home, and a detriment if she shall move, in the form of the loss of 
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oi ie-1 lalf of r - • '• ! ^ •' ,J ' '• Tree o: I)i\orce, the Property had equit> as 
determined by UK existing indebtedness. \L Sattcrtkld and Petitioner Allen each have a 
claim to one-half the Property, subject to one-half the existing indebtedness. Ms. Satterfield 
Divorce. 
The trial court and the court of appeals both construed the Decree of Divorce to permit 
IV Is. Satterfield to encumber and borrow agaii ist Petitioner Allen' s one-half of the I Property,, 
intent of the parties and would render the Decree of Divorce a nullity. The analysis needs 
to be focused on the intent of the parties to the Decree of Divorce and not on the interest of 
the unrelated Respondents. 
When " : J • ' " > • 
Allen testified that the loan balance at that time was approximate^ $75,560.1, _ ^ 
Property was sold to Respondent Hall, Petitioner Allen testified that the loan balance wot ild 
1:1 le loan balance woi ild 1 ia\ e bee i I appi oxii nately $58,759,60, 
Ms. Satterfield had the ability under the Decree of Divorce to deal only with her 
interest in the Property That interest consisted of a fee simple determinable, subject to a 
possibility ' of re\ ei ter; a i igl it to oi le 1 lalf of tl le equity ii l the I 'ropei ty, as determined based 
II III i l rhl .ll tin l l l l i r of Ihr Mi'HTi nl | l 'n ntt c mil i i|i>hl In lllliii n lhr i IIUIK h i l l n| illllii 
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equity in the Property if she remained in Salt Lake City, Utah, until the last child of the 
marriage reached age 18. The Decree of Divorce did not give Ms. Satterfield any rights to 
deal with Petitioner Allen's one-half of the Property. 
Ms. Satterfield did not stay in Salt Lake City, and upon the occurrence of the 
determining event, Ms. Satterfield, and her successors in interest, had their interest in the 
Property terminated and ownership of the Property vested in Petitioner Allen. 
Respondents suggested at trial that the equity to which Petitioner Allen was entitled 
upon the occurrence of the determining event was limited to the equity on the date of the 
Decree of Divorce. This is not what the Decree of Divorce says. If that were the intent, then 
the language of the Decree of Divorce would have specified a dollar amount of the proceeds, 
representing the agreed equity, to go to Petitioner Allen with the balance to go to Ms. 
Satterfield. Instead, the Decree of Divorce directs that Petitioner Allen is to divide the 
proceeds from the sale, whenever that might occur, equally with Ms. Satterfield. The 
reasonable reading here is that the proceeds would be divided equally after satisfaction of the 
indebtedness existing on the date of the Decree of Divorce, indebtedness on which Petitioner 
Allen and Ms. Satterfield were jointly and severally liable, resulting in an equal equity 
division. 
As was shown at trial, Ms. Satterfield, through the means of refinancing accelerated 
the realization of the equity to which she would have been entitled. However, the Decree of 
Divorce does not give Ms. Satterfield any right to accelerate the realization of any portion 
of Petitioner Allen's equity to which she might have become entitled had she satisfied the 
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provisions of the Decree of Divorce. Nor does the Decree of Divorce give any other person 
a right to realize any portion of Petitioner Allen 's interest in the Property. 
Ambiguity 
I In In lull i ill!! I Hind llliiil Ihr I Vi in nl 1 Msout' v ;r. iiiiilnii»uoii% „iiinl iiiiilii'ipnlnll illlllhir 
D e c n v , ! MI) that o die Pmpertv reverted to Petitioner Allen, the Propv*i\ 
would be subject to all liens and encumbrances at the time of reversion. Record at 5 50. 
paragraph 2. The court of appeals agreed. See Addendum, Exhibit " B . " I hi> uwdv . -
erroneous. 
Whenambigi lity exists. It le ii ltei it of tt le partie s be coi lies aqi lestion of fact. Plateau 
Mining Co. V. Utah Div. Of State Lands & Forestry, 802 l\2d 720, 725 (Utah . Ji 
Therefore, "failure to resolve an ambiguity by determining the parties' intent from,, parol 
evidence is erro . t i IOI lstrateai i ibigi lity "tl lecoi ltrai } positioi is < pai ties ii n ist 
each be tenable " I :1 
First, there are only two parties to the Decree of Divorce, Petitioner Allen and. Ms. 
Satterfield. Second, there is no evidence of contrary positions, tenable or otherwise. 
Coi lsequei lib ' , tl lei e is i 10 ai i ibigi iit> ii I tl le Disci ee of Dn > :)i ce 
I 'etitioner \,l.lei I testified as to the intent of the parties to the Decree of Divorce. 
Record at 586 and 589. If the Property reverted to hit n, he would be responsible to make the 
payments on the debt until the Property was sold, but the only debt to which the Property was 
be si lbject was to be tl i,e debt e: dsting at tl ic tii i le of theDeci ee of Di »/ oi ce. 
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Respondents Hall and Homecomings are not parties to the Decree of Divorce and their 
claims as to the meaning of the Decree of Divorce are irrelevant. 
Respondents' Standing to Assert Claims 
Respondent Hall and Respondent Homecomings have both attempted to protect their 
interests by alleging a claim against Petitioner Allen and the Property under the Decree of 
Divorce. It has already been shown that neither Respondent Hall nor Respondent 
Homecomings has any remaining interest in the Property because their interests terminated 
with the fee simple determinable. Likewise, neither Respondent Hall nor Respondent 
Homecomings has any rights against Petitioner Allen or the Property under the Decree of 
Divorce. The Decree of Divorce is in the nature of a contract and the Respondents are 
neither parties to the contract nor third-party beneficiaries of the contract. 
A fundamental principle of contract law is privity: that only parties to the contract may 
enforce the rights and obligations created by the contract. 17A Am. Jur.2d Contracts §421 
(1991). Respondents are not parties to the Decree of Divorce and therefore may not enforce 
any rights or obligations created by the Decree of Divorce. 
The existence of third-party beneficiary status "is determined by examining a written 
contract." Am. Towers Owners Assoc., Inc. v. CC1 Meek, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 
1996). The written contract must show that the contracting parties "clearly intended to confer 
a separate and distinct benefit upon the third-party." Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 
P.2d 527,536 (Utah 1993). There was no apparent intent in the Decree of Divorce to confer 
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i LI i) be i lefit oni eitl ler of the Respondents. Thus, they are not entitled to any recovery under 
the Decree of Divorce. 
If Respondent 1lomeeomings were entitled to any recovery under iia decree of 
I I»I\ «ini v it would liau: loiii.si il liiotliiiiii ml I in (Invi l\\ aiMiinsI Ms S.itk » hdil in is i IIInnIII 
()*iif\ K u d u i,ir\ ""! fit" llii" I Vrnvof* | ) i \ o n r KYspoiiclHif 1 lomcvomings did neither, ±o 
award Respondent Homecomings any claim under the Decree of Divorce is in conflict with 
accepted ,'iilrai' \ iw. 
. tfterthe i - ; .'ced nor the Decree of Divorce requires Petitioner Allen lo assume 
)i i i„, i • it! l respect to the Proper t) except tl le ai nor tizedbalai IC z it: 
what would have been the amortized balance, of the debt which existed on the Propert) on 
the date of the Decree of Divorce. 
:IE!HE1< < COURT OF A i n t \ , - \n i .. . . . 
• - •
 f F O R T ? ^ E N R I C H M E N T 
Petitionei Allen claimed, and the court of appeals ultimately decided, that he held a 
reversionary interest in the Property. IJpon the occurrence of the triggering event, ownership 
of the Property automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen. 
1 11 I ;:!: ti iiiiall :> : in ii t ::l ;::i: lii z :1 I etitioi lei ",|1 llei fs ::: 1 ai.i :t I : f tl i- 2 1 11 iji 1st ei 11 icl 11 :i lei it : f 
Respondents. The trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law, one way or the 
other, respecting this claim of Petitioner Allen. I lowevei; consistent with the trial court's 
ruiMK- ihdi l\jiiih'in.i Aiien had no interest in the Property, the trial court likely considered 
I 'etitioi lei < Ulei 1" s claii 1 1 fc 1 1 estiti itic -\ 1 of 1 in iji 11st ei iricl 11 1 lei it a 1 11 lllitj ' 
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All rights to the Property automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen on or about July 
15, 1999. Respondent Hall testified that subsequent to July 15, 1999 and until the date of 
trial he personally occupied the Property for part of the time and rented the Property for part 
of the time. Respondent Hall testified that the fair market rental of the Property was between 
$1,200.00 per month and $1,400.00 per month. Record at 642-643. 
In order to prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, three elements must be met. First, 
there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another. Second, the conferee must 
appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. Finally, there must be the acceptance or 
retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable 
for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value. Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B 
& L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, f 1 3 , 12 P.3d 580. 
The court of appeals has reversed the trial court and ruled that the Property 
automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen. Consequently, the denial of Petitioner Allen's 
claim for restitution of unjust enrichment must also be reversed and considered. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner Allen asks the Supreme Court (i) to reverse the 
court of appeals' ruling that Respondent Hall is entitled to recovery under the Utah 
Occupying Claimants Act or, if it is not inclined to do so, to reverse the court of appeals' 
ruling that the Utah Occupying Claimants Act was properly applied to determine the amount 
of the recovery to which Respondent Hall is entitled; (ii) to reverse the court of appeals' 
ruling that Petitioner Allen is responsible for all indebtedness on the Property existing at the 
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time of the reversion and to find that Petitioner Allen is entitled to the Property free and clear 
of all indebtedness excepting and amount equal to the amortized balance of the indebtedness 
on tin Property al the dale ul llir Decree nil Divorce. JIHI l m i mi l I ICUTM llu Iun.il I 
IVht inncr M i n i i, L I I I I I til iiiiiiiii|ii-.ll rni'h Imiri i t ,iml n i i i i i i n l llu iinn In llu III mill i mi l l II i 
reconsideration consistent with the ruling of the court of appeals that ownership of the 
Property reverted to Petitioner Allen nisL^ * 5 1 f )0° 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 
i "L. . Ul AI I CODE AN N. §57-6-1 et.seq., Utah Occupying Claimants Act. 
B. ~>i * ".•:. of the TTuh Court of Appeals dated Tanuaiy 21. 200^ 
r
 Decree o\ l Jivoree dated May 
<• R e\ ersioi is , ai id Exceptioi is date d 
Uv.ooer28, IW* 
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UTAH OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS ACT 
y1 l> I ""1 iv ill e\ee 11 I  il (I i in in nil |iiiiiiiiiiiiillll| iiiiii  ill iilllll pii'ist .ion 
Where an occupant of teal esiale lias coloi oi title lo the teal estate, and ill i > I 
(ailli has made valuable improvement*1 on (he real estate, and is afterwards in apiopu 
action tound not to be the owner, no million shall issue to put the owner in possession 
of the real estate after the filing of a i mi j I mnt as hereinafter provided, until the 
provisions of this chapter have been complied w ill h 
57-6-2. Claimant to commence action — Complaint Trial of issues. 
Such complaint must set forth the grounds on which the defendant seeks relief, 
stating as accurately as practicable the value of the real estate, exclusive of the 
improvements thereon made by the claimant or his grantors, and the value of such 
improvements. The issues joined thereon must be tried as in law actions, and the value < >t 
the real estate and of such improvements must be separately ascertained on the trial. 
57-6-3. Rights of parties — Acquiring other's interest or holding as tenants in 
conini mi iiii 
I he plaint i fl in the main action ma) thereupon pay the appraised \ alue of the 
impnnements and take the property, but should he fail to do so after a reasonable time, to 
be fixed by the court, the defendant may take the property upon paying its value 
exclusive of the improvements. If this is not done within a reasonable time, to be fixed by 
the court, the parties will be held to be tenants in common of all the real estate, including 
the impro^ ements, each holding an interest proportionate to the values ascertained on the 
trial 
S7 0-4. Certain persons considued lo hold under color of title. 
[1) A purchaser in good faith at an) judicial or tax sale made b> the proper person 
or officer has color of title within the meaning of this chapter, whether or not the person 
or officer has sufficient authority to self unless the want of authority was known to tin 
purchaser at the time of the sale. 
(2) (a) Any person has color oi title nlio lias occupied a tiatl ol ical estate try 
himsell, or by those under whom he claims, for the term of five years, or who has 
occupied it for less time, if he, or those under whom he claims, have at any time during 
the occupancy with the knowledge or consent, express or implied, of the real owner made 
an) valuable improvements on the real estate, or if he or those under whom he claims 
have at any time during the occupancy paid the ordinary count) taxes on the real estate for 
any one year, and two years have elapsed without a repayment by the owner, and the 
occupancy is continued up to the time at which the action is brought by which the 
recovery of the real estate is obtained. 
(b) The person's rights shall pas* I i In assignees or represonhln rs. 
\ 1 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to give tenants color of title against 
their landlords or give any person a claim under color of title to school or institutional 
trust lands as defined in Subsection 53C-1-103(6). 
57-6-5. Settlers under state or federal law or contract deemed occupying 
claimants. 
When any person has settled upon any real estate and occupied the same for three 
years under or by virtue of any law or contract with the proper officers of the state for the 
purchase thereof, or under any law of, or by virtue of any purchase from, the United 
States, and shall have made valuable improvements thereon, and shall be found not to be 
the owner thereof, or not to have acquired a right to purchase the same from the state or 
the United States, such person shall be an occupying claimant within the meaning of this 
chapter. 
57-6-6. Setoff against claim for improvements. 
In the cases above provided for, if the occupying claimant has committed any 
injury to the real estate by cutting timber, or otherwise, the plaintiff may set the same off 
against any claim for improvements made by the claimant. 
57-6-7. When execution on judgment of possession may issue. 
The plaintiff in the main action is entitled to an execution to put him in possession 
of his property in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, but not otherwise. 
57-6-8. Improvements made by occupants of land granted to state. 
Any person having improvements on any real estate granted to the state in aid of 
any work of internal improvement, whose title thereto is questioned by another, may 
remove such improvements without injury otherwise to such real estate, at any time 
before he is evicted therefrom, or he may claim and have the benefit of this chapter by 
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Attorneys: James G. Swensen Jr., Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Bruce J. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Thome. 
THORNE, Judge: 
i, i iJdvid J .'Allen appeals from the trial coui t's order quieting 
title in real property in favor of Thomas K. Hall and Homecomings 
Financial Network, Inc. We reverse in part and affirm in part 
BACKGROUND 
11J Allen and his former spouse, Sarah Satterfield Allen 
(Satterfield), were divorced in 1990. The divorce decree awarded 
Satterfield real property owned by Allen, contingent upon her 
maintaining the house payments and not moving more than fifty 
miles from Salt Lake City, Utah, until after the parties1 
youngest child turned eighteen 1 I Jpon the failure of either of 
Paragraph 10 of All en and Satterfield's divorce decree 
statedi 
[Allen] is purchasing the house and lot 
located at 10159 Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah 
(continued 
these two conditions the property and all of its related debt 
were to revert to Allen, and the property was to be sold. Any 
equity realized from the sale was to be divided equally between 
Allen and Satterfield. Allen and Satterfield's youngest child 
did not turn eighteen until August 6, 2003. 
f3 Allen transferred the property to Satterfield by quitclaim 
deed in 1993. The deed contained the following language of 
reservation: 
This Quit-Claim Deed is subject to the rights 
and reservations included in that certain 
Decree of Divorce entered by the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah in the case of David John Allen 
v. Sarah Satterfield Allen, Civil No. 
894903635 (dated May 17, 1990). Said Decree 
1. (...continued) 
which shall be awarded to [Satterfield] as 
her sole and separate property subject to no 
claim by [Allen] except as set forth in this 
paragraph. [Satterfield] shall be 
responsible for all indebtedness and expenses 
therefrom, holding [Allen] harmless 
therefrom. [Allen] shall provide 
[Satterfield] with a quit-claim deed within 
3 0 days of the divorce becoming final, with 
said quit-claim deed to contain the 
provisions that it is contingent upon 
[Satterfield] maintaining durrent [sic] house 
payments and not moving from the Salt Lake 
City area before the [parties'] last child 
reaches age 18. . . . If [Satterfield] shall 
move more than 50 miles from Salt Lake City 
Utah before the last child reaches age 18, 
ownership of the marital residence shall 
revert to [Allen] , who will then sell the 
home and divide the proceeds equally with 
[Satterfield], and who1 will be responsible 
for all indebtedness thereon until the house 
is sold. These provisions are to ensure that 
the children have a suitable residence during 
their minority, and are structured to provide 
a benefit to [Satterfield] if she shall 
continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah in 
the form of all of the equity in said home, 
and a detriment if she shall move, in the 
form of the loss of one-half of the equity. 
of Divorce provides, in part, that if the 
grantee fails to maintain current house 
payments or if the grantee shall move more 
than 50 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah, 
before the grantor and grantee's last child 
reaches 18 year [sic] of age, title and 
ownership of the above described property 
shall revert to the grantor. 
The deed from Allen to Satterfield was recorded in Salt Lake 
County in 1994. 
14 Satterfield refinanced the property several times between 
1990 and 1998. Allen was aware of some of these actions, and 
assisted Satterfield in refinancing the property on at least one 
occasion by providing her with an affidavit. Allen never 
objected to Satterfield's actions, despite their practical effect 
of reducing the property's equity value, to which Allen had a 
contingent interest. 
%5 In January 1998, Satterfield sold the property to Hall. 
Hall paid Satterfield $7000 in cash and agreed to assume the 
existing first and second mortgages totaling approximately 
$139,000. Satterfield transferred the property to Hall by 
quitclaim deed and continued to reside in the Salt Lake City 
area. In June 1999, Hall retired the existing mortgages by 
refinancing the property with appellee Homecomings Financial 
Network, Inc., in the amount of $151,900. Homecomings then 
recorded a security interest in the property. 
f6 Satterfield moved to North Carolina in July 1999. Shortly 
thereafter, Allen contacted Hall and made a claim to the property 
under the terms of the deed and the incorporated divorce decree. 
Hall refused to recognize Allen's claim, and in 2000 Allen 
brought suit against Hall to quiet title under the deed. Hall 
counterclaimed for reimbursement for valuable improvements and 
other damages. 
1)7 After a bench trial, the trial court quieted title to the 
property in Hall. The court entered extensive findings of fact 
and conclusions of law to support its order. Among its reasons 
for quieting title in Hall, the court listed laches, estoppel, 
and unjust enrichment; extinguishment of Allen's interest based 
upon lack of equity as established during Satterfield's 1998 
bankruptcy proceeding; and ambiguity in the divorce decree 
resulting in substantial inequitable harm to Hall. The trial 
court also found that, if Allen were to be awarded title to the 
property, he would take the property subject to all existing debt 
thereon, and that Hall would be entitled to reimbursement for 
$42,279.36 in improvements, $10,000 in labor, and $6974.67 in 
real property taxes. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f8 Allen raises multiple issues challenging the trial court's 
application of the law of real property and the Utah Occupying 
Claimants Act (Claimants Act), see Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1 to -8 
(2000). Allen's arguments present questions of law that we 
review for correctness. See Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., 
Inc. , 1999 UT 100,1(31, 989 P.2d 1077 (reviewing trial court's 
legal conclusions regarding application of estoppel doctrine for 
correctness); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1998) 
(reviewing interpretation of Claimants Act for correctness) ; 
Nelson v. Provo City, 2000 UT App 204,1(9, 6 P. 3d 567 (reviewing 
questions of property law for correctness); Anderson v. Poms, 
1999 UT App 207,1[8, 984 P.2d 392 (" [T] he determination of whether 
a party was prejudiced for purposes of the doctrine of laches is 
a legal conclusion that we review for correctness [.]") ; Eyring v. 
Fairbanks, 918 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (reviewing 
divorce decree for ambiguity under correctness standard); 
Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239, 242 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) ("Review of the trial court's conclusion as to the 
legal effect of the bankruptcy court's orders presents a question 
of law.") 
ANALYSIS 
f9 The trial court's quiet title order rested on various 
theories, including laches, estoppel, and unjust enrichment. 
Allen argues that each theory relied upon by the trial court 
ignores the clear conditional language of Allen's recorded 1993 
property deed to Satterfield, and the statutory presumption that 
Hall had full knowledge of that recorded instrument when he 
purchased the property from Satterfield in 1998. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-3-102(1) (2000) ("Each [deed] shall, from the time of 
recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to 
all persons of [its] contents."). 
KlO We agree with Allen that the terms of the deed entitled him 
to a possibility of reverter that became a fee simple interest 
upon Satterfield's moving to North Carolina in July 1999. We 
also agree that, pursuant to section 57-3-102, Hall is deemed to 
have had notice of Allen's interest from the time of recording in 
1994. See id.; see also Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready 
Mix, Inc. , 2004 UT 23,1(17, 89 P.3d 155 ("' [O] ne who deals with 
real property is charged with notice of what is shown by the 
records of the county recorder of the county in which the 
property is situated.1" (quoting Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 
1 P.2d 242, 247 (1931))). However sympathetic to Hall the facts 
of this case might be if he did not have notice of Allen's 
interest, we must proceed under the statutory presumption that 
Hall was aware that he was purchasing property subject to 
potential divestiture if Satterfield relocated. 
i|ll Hall's notice of Allen's interest destroys any equitable 
ground upon which the court could quiet title in Hall, as Hall 
cannot be said to have had any good faith belief that he was 
purchasing the property in fee simple. The trial court's 
reliance on Satterfield's bankruptcy proceedings is also 
misplaced given the language of the deed and divorce decree, 
which we find to be clear and unambiguous. Even if, as found by 
the trial court, there was no equity in the property at the time 
that it was released from the bankruptcy proceeding, Allen was 
still entitled to title ownership of the property once the 
conditions in the deed to Satterfield were satisfied. In sum, as 
Allen asserts on appeal, Hall knowingly purchased only that 
property interest that Satterfield had to sell. That property 
interest reverted to Allen in 1999 when Satterfield left the 
state, and title must be quieted in Allen rather than Hall.2 
fl2 Having determined that Allen is entitled to the property, we 
must address the question of whether Allen must also assume the 
current debt on the property. The trial court concluded, 
pursuant to the divorce decree, that Allen would be responsible 
for all indebtedness on the property if he were to retake it. We 
agree. The decree, which was incorporated into the 1993 deed, 
states that upon reversion Allen "will be responsible for all 
indebtedness thereon until the house is sold." This clear 
language indicates that Allen takes the property subject to any 
debt existing at the time of the reversion, and we affirm the 
trial court on this issue. 
Ul3 Further, we can identify no error in the trial court's 
application of the Claimants Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1 to 
-8 (2000) . The Claimants Act states, in part: 
Where an occupant of real estate has color of 
title to the real estate, and in good faith 
has made valuable improvements on the real 
estate, and is afterwards in a proper action 
found not to be the owner, no execution shall 
2. Subject to the requirements of the Claimants Act. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-6-1 to -8 (2000) . 
issue to put the owner in possession of the 
real estate after the filing of a complaint 
as hereinafter provided, until the provisions 
of this chapter have been complied with. 
Id. § 57-6-1. Thus, one seeking reimbursement under the 
Claimants Act must show that he or she had color of title to real 
property, made valuable improvements to that property, and did so 
in good faith. Allen concedes on appeal that Hall had color of 
title to the property when he made improvements to it. 
1|l4 Allen did not preserve any objection to the trial court's 
use of Hall's evidence regarding the value of goods and labor 
expended in improving the property, nor did Allen present any 
contradictory evidence suggesting that the improvements were for 
a lesser amount. Even if this issue had been preserved, there is 
record evidence supporting the trial court's determination that 
Hall is entitled to reimbursement for improvements and labor in 
the amount of $52,279.36. 
1|l5 The trial court found that, at the time Hall purchased the 
property, it had a "fair market value [of] approximately 
$146,000." This finding is supported by Satterfield and Hall's 
agreed upon price of $146,000 for the property in January 1998, 
and by Satterfield's March 1998 bankruptcy filing and subsequent 
ruling by the bankruptcy court. By April 1999, after Hall's 
improvements, the property was appraised at $200,000. Hall 
testified as to the appraisal value at trial, and submitted the 
appraisal report as an exhibit. The $54,000 difference between 
fair market value at purchase and the April 1999 appraisal value 
of $200,000 approximates and readily supports the trial court's 
determination of the proper reimbursement amount. 
1|l6 Finally, contrary to Allen's assertions on appeal, Hall 
acted in good faith in improving the property. Even assuming, as 
we must, that Hall knew of the possibility of reversion of the 
property to Allen, Hall had a good faith belief in his ownership 
of the property until he received notice that Satterfield had 
actually fulfilled the condition in the deed, sometime after June 
1999. Cf. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 1998) 
(concluding that a good faith belief in a life interest in land 
satisfies the good faith requirement of the Claimants Act). From 
the record, it is apparent that the improvements claimed by Hall 
all occurred in 1998, prior to Satterfield's departure from Utah. 
1Il7 The trial court properly applied the Claimants Act to 
determine the amount of Hall's reimbursement. On remand, the 
trial court is to apply the remaining provisions of the Claimants 
Act to ensure that Hall is reimbursed for his claim prior to 
Allen taking title to the property.3 
CONCLUSION 
fl8 Allen is ent 
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the property subj 
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edings consistent with this opinion. 
Willia-
H19 WE CONCUR: 
iith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
^UC^AJ} 
Norman H. Jackson, Jg^e 
3. The Claimants Act sets out the procedures to be followed 
after a successful claim for reimbursement for improvements: 
The plaintiff in the main action may 
thereupon pay the appraised value of the 
improvements and take the property, but 
should he fail to do so after a reasonable 
time, to be fixed by the court, the defendant 
may take the property upon paying its value, 
exclusive of the improvements. If this is 
not done within a reasonable time, to be 
fixed by the court, the parties will be held 
to be tenants in common of all the real 
estate, including the improvements, each 
holding an interest proportionate to the 
values ascertained on the trial. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-3. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of January, 2 005, a true 
and correct copy of the attached DECISION was deposited in the 
United States mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be 
delivered to: 
JAMES G SWENSEN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
136 S MAIN ST #318 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
BRUCE J NELSON 
NELSON CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN 
68 S MAIN ST STE 600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
HONORABLE TYRONE MEDLEY 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Judicial Secretary <^^ 
TRIAL COURT: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 000904054 
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20030633-CA 
EXHIBIT "C" 
t W 31 2G0O 15:37 FR RFC LEGAL 612 979 4190 TO 919013281445 P. 11/17 
Thir ! Judicial 0.:.'(r\->t 
Jan<s Allan, Bar #4S 
Attorney for plaintiff 
o £act 300 south, suite 735 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-1300 
XN TUB THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SftLT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH • .'!' ' C ''' 
OAVID JOHN ALLEN, > 
plaintiff, j DECREE OP DIVORCE 
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- ; ais^eo^ 
SKRAX SATTERFIELD ALLEN, , c i v f f i l " f S s o ^ l " * 
defendant % \ -r«, 7 ** <_ ^ 
Judge John A- Rokich 
This matter czune on for hearing the 17th day of May, 1990. 
The plaintiff was present with his attorney, Jane Allen. The 
defendant was not present, having executed and filed with the court 
an appearancer conscmt, and waiver in which she agreed that her-v. 
default *nay be entered* Based upon the testimony of the plaintiff, 
the? file herein, good cause appearing therefor, and the court 
having made and entered the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, it is hereby ordared, adjudged, and decrsad: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
la The plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce, the same to 
become final upon entry. 
2. The plaintiff has been '\ resident of Salt LaJce County for 
the three months immediately prior to the filing of this Complaint 
for Divorce 
3. The parties were married on Hay 31, IDOB in chatanpoga, 
w CP PPC LEGRi G12 979 4190 TO 918013281445 P. 12/17 
W Y 31 2000 15:37 FR RFC LXGH-
/** 
Venn^ee, and are now and have beon sinc^ that time husband and 
wife, 
4e The parties suffer from irreconcilabla differences, 
5- Thero have been £49MBr« Qttildratn born of this marriage, to 
wit: Ashley Angier, b o m January 24, 1981; Samuel Havid Allen, 
born August 13, 1982; Peter Kale Allan, born October 12, 1902; and 
William John, born August 25, 1985. 
6. The defendant i5 a fit and proper person to be awarded 
the care, custody and control of the minor children of the partios 
subject to the plaintiff's reasonable and liberal rights of 
visitation, upon reasonable notice to the defendant. 
7- The plaintiff sha.ll pay child support to tho defendant in 
the amount of $200.00 per child, 5800.00 total for the four 
children until said child reaches age 18 or graduates from high 
school with his or her class, whichever comes last. 
8. The defendant shall be entitled to Mandatory income 
withholding relief should the plaintiff" become more than 3 0 days 
in arrears in his child support obligation. 
9. The plaintiff shall koep in force any policy of health 
and accident insurance available through his employment or pay ths 
cost to provide insuranca through tho defendant's employment, for 
the benefit of the minor children of the parties, with thfc 
plaintiff to pay any non-routine modical, demtal, optical, or 
orthodontic expenses incurred by the minor children of the parties 
which is not covered by insurance* The plaintiff shall bear the 
cost of caid insurance, which presently is 560.00 per month. 
10. The* plaintiff ia purchasing the house and lot located at 
~n CP KC lXGfiL 612 979 4190 TO 9180i328i4« P. H'17 
>AY 31 20o0 15:37 FR RFC LLbR-
lOlbL? i. landers Road, Sandy, Utah which shall fro award&d to the 
defendant as her sole and separata property subject to no claim by 
the plaintiff except as set forth in this paragraph. Thu defendant 
shall bo rcponsiblc for all indebtedness and expenses therefrom, 
holdinq the plaintiff harmless therefrom- The plaintiff- ^hal"' 
provide the defendant with o quit-claim deed within 3 0 day^ of tha 
divorce becoming final, with said quit-claim deed to contain the 
provisions that it is contingent upon the defendant maintaining 
durrent house payments and not moving from the Salt Lake City arek 
before the last child reaches age 10. If the defendant shall 
become more than 60 days in arrears in the payments for aaid house, 
the plaintiff shall have the option of paying the mortgage payment 
directly to the lender in lieu of child support, and sending the 
difference, if any, to the defendant. If the defendant shall move 
more than 50 miles from Salt Lake city Utah before the last child 
reaches age 18, ownership of the marital residence shall revert to 
ifttt flBLaitvtiff, who will then se31 the home and ^PUfe the proceeds 
equally with the defendant, and who will be responsible for all 
indebtedness thereon until the house is sold. These provisions are 
to ensure that the children have a suitable residenca during their 
minority, and arc structured to provide a benefit to tha defendant 
if she shall continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah in the form 
of all of the equity in said heme, and a detriment if she shal] 
move, in the form of the loss of one-half of the equity. 
11. The personal proporty of the parties has been divided 
equitably botwoon them n^<3 each party shall retain the property 
presently m his or her poserssio' , with the party retaining an item 
to ba responsible far all indebtedness thereon* 
12. The plaintiff shall pay alimony to thfc defendant at the 
rats of §800,00 per month beginning May 1, 1990 and continuing 
until April 31; 1991, at which tixu'i it shall decrease to 5400, oo 
per month. If the defendant shall earn more than $12,000 per year 
in the first year following thp divorce, the alimony shall 
immediately decrease to $400.00 par month* Said alimony shall 
terminate upon the death of either party or by operation of law. 
Child support and alimony payments aru dua in two equal payments 
on the 1st and 15th of each month. 
13. The plaintiff shall retain the automobile presently in 
his possession and the defendant 3hs.ll retain the Volkswagen with 
the plaintiff to be responsible for all indebtedness ^nd 
maintenance expenses, holding the defendant harmless therefrom, 
for his automobile/ and also the vol-csvagcn and he shall jaako ail 
car payments and maintain insurance coverage until such time as tho 
Automobile is sold by the defendant ur paid for in full, at which 
time the plaintiff shall deliver title to said automobile to the 
defendant and this obligation shall cease, This obligation shall 
terminate on the death of the defendant/ ox when paid in full 
whichever comes first, and shall ba considered alimony for tax 
purposes• 
14. Tha plaintiff shall pay the debt for the Volkswagen. Thr-. 
defendant shall pay all student loans ^n her name alone. Each party 
shall be solely responsible for all debts incurred in his or her 
own name* after Dacsrober, X980, holding the other party harmless 
therefrom. The plaintiff knows of no unpaid marital debts. 
r.YJl 20CB i5:3T, f R ^  UL.UK. 
15. Tho plaintiff shall maintain a life insurance policy on 
his life in uhe amount of $250,000, tha proceeds of which sha3 1 be 
payable into a trust of which all cC the parties* children ^ra tho 
beneficiaries, which shall b& maintained until the youngc:,t. child 
reaches age 22 or graduates from collage with his clas:>t, vmichovcj 
occuirs later. 
16* The defendant shall claim all of the children as 
dependents for income tax purposes. 
17. The plaintiff shall provide for the children:*f college 
educations if he is -Tinanoially ablg in an amount not inora than hie 
child support obligation, on the condition that they maintain at 
least a ,fB,f average c.nd attend school full time. $aia support shall 
end at age 22 or upon graduation from college with an undargraduatc 
degree, whichever Comes first* 
18. The plaintiff has paid all attorneys's foes and costs 
incurred in this action to data. 
DATED this IZ day of J2t^f^ / 1990, 
By THE COURT: 
.ka\i$ge John A- Ro)?icn 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
*rti£y that I mailed a 'crua and correct copy oi the 
foregoing decree of divorce to Sarah Satterfield Allen, 10150 
Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah 84070, postage prepaid this £7. day off 
May, 1990, 
S W (DCft ^ — 
EXHIBIT "D" 
Mtfcjprft* w> ii I urn 
s 
prraN RBCPRDEQ a^mr* TQI 
E- H. PAiNKItAJSER 
Artornoy a t Law 
24 i Cast 400 South, Suite ZOO 
5 * I t Luke Ci ty , Utnh 84111 
0S/iJ/9< 0?;5n Att l O - Q O 
K A T I E l _ DXXOH 
RECQKOER; SALT LAKi: CQUHTYr UTAH 
E H FAHKHAUSER 
REC QTJZ JOHrWSDtf I O L H J T V - HP 
Davia J* Allen
 f c a n t o r fc'Tnby flUIT-CUaiS, s u b j e c t 1.0 tin 
r*4»t^vationa, rovsriuons, wid a^captignG contained harain, to Garah 
S a t . t w r f i c l d Al len , grantee, of 1C159 South Flandara Road, 2andy 
c i t y , S a l t Lake County, S ta te o l Utah f o r tha sun or t-:n ana 
fia/iooths Dol lars ($10.QO) an J other good and v c i u a b l c 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , tho fol lowing descr ibed t r a c t u£ land i n G<il'. UU',;L 
cgunty , s t a t ^ of UtJiiu 
Lot; 3 , . WHITE CITY NO. 41, according t o t h a o z r i c i a l p l a t 
t h e r e o f , as recorded in t n s o££iou of tha sa l t : Lake. 
County Recorder• 
This Quit-Claim D6ud i s cuhjaoti to the r i g h t s and r e s e r v a t i o n s 
i n c l u d e d i n that cer ta in Decree of Divorca ontcrod by thu Third 
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t court, s a l t Lak^ County, 3'cata of Utah in tha 
c a c e of Dgvifl John ^l len v, Saro>. S a t t o r f l a l d A l lan . c i v D No. 
G94903635 (datad May 17, 1990), sa id Decree of o ivorco prowidcy, 
in p a r t , t h a t i f tho grantee f a i l s t o nuxintain current hciujc: 
payments or- it tha grant*© s h a l l rccva more than 50 mi lae frcr. a a l t 
Laka C i t y , Utah/ tuforu the grantor and gvantes 'a larri: c h i l d 
r e a c h e s 16 year of ago, *%!tlfijf*and ownership oC thfe &hm9bjQttG&ilN& 
fMiffettfey s h a l l rovart to the grantor* 
1933, 
WITNESS tha hand Q£ sa id graotar, tyls 2Bth day o£ Gcuobsr 
IHWVXDUAt, ACteiOHteDGEWENff 
A 3 . 
STATE OP UTAH 
COUNTY OF^fffJ' {(? Qm J 
On t h i s zo^h day of o c t o b e - 199 3 r boforo me p e r s o n a l l y 
appanrad David J. Al len , who being by m* duly sworn did cay t h a t ho 
i s t h e s i g n e r of tna foregoing instrurcfcrxt and who duly acknowledged 
t o Mi* t h a t hfc/shc cxccqtaa the oara6/ /7 
My i a o i o n Expirac: 
OlUWmALLAN^qUITCLJSCa 
urtfcrxt and who duly acknowledged 
Raiding atiJLP/, . f &/('•'/&£££,'- , 
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Attorneys for Respondent Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. 
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